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Tariff Rate Quotas:
Does Administration Matter?
At the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were in-
tended to serve two purposes: first, to prevent that tar-
iffication would lead – at least on the short term – to a
deterioration of market access and second, to create new,
minimum market access. The since then observed fill rates
do not match with these intentions, being often rather low.
A wide-held suspicion explains this with tariff quota admin-
istration imposing an extra barrier to trade. It is the aim
of this paper to test whether different administrative meth-
ods do indeed contribute to explain variation in fill rates
and if so, how. A censored regression model for panel data
was developed and applied to the EU’s TRQs for the years
1995–2000. The data supported the presumption that ad-
ministration matters, sometimes in surprising ways.
1 Introduction
Since they were institutionalized in the Uruguay Round, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have
become an important market access instrument in agricultural trade. All OECD coun-
tries, except Turkey, have scheduled TRQs at the WTO (OECD 2002, p.20). These
often account for a substantial share of tariff lines (OECD 2002, p.34). However, com-
plaints about this trade instrument abound and consequently, TRQs are a prominent
issue in the ongoing negotiations on agricultural trade liberalization. In particular, TRQ
administration is often held responsible for the many low or medium fill rates that can
be observed in most countries (WTO 2001). Several authors have raised this point, for
instance Skully (1999), IATRC (2001), Boughner & de Gorter (1999). In the WTO
talks, proposals for reform have been submitted by the US (WTO 2000a) or different
developing countries –see Matthews & Laroche Dupraz (2001) for an overview. The
Harbinson proposal also picked up the issue (WTO 2003).
This paper aims to contribute to the TRQ debate by presenting the results of an econo-
metric model that was developed to test, first, which factors contribute to explain vari-
ation in fill rates and whether TRQ administration belongs to them. Second, if different
methods of TRQ administration have an impact on fill rates –as, in fact, they do– the
empirical analysis should indicate whether it is comparatively positive or negative. By
applying the model to the EU TRQs for the period 1995–2000, these questions could
be answered at least for this important agricultural import market, where TRQs play a
substantial role. So far, there has been very little empirical work on TRQs in general and
none on TRQ administration in particular. The OECD (2002) has modelled TRQs in
a modified version of its Aglink model, but has abstracted from modelling the different
methods of TRQ administration. Other contributions evaluated these administrative
methods based on theoretical considerations or models (see Skully (1999), de Gorter,
Falk & Hranaiova (2003), Chau, de Gorter & Hranaiova (2003) or Gervais & Surprenant
(2000)) which allowed only few definite conclusions.
In order to apply an econometric model to TRQ data, some conceptual problems had to
be overcome. The central question was how to combine a method suitable for censored
regression with the panel structure of the data. The latter had to be exploited in order
to avoid the inconsistency caused by an important omitted variable. The solution found
is simple and appears to work very well. Thus, it could be a method of interest to many
other applications with a similar data structure.
In the next section, the main characteristics of TRQs and their administration will be
shortly presented. For a more extensive treatment, see, for instance, Skully (1999),
OECD (2002), Mo¨nnich (2003) or IATRC (2001). The emphasis of section 3 is on
the main results of the model, while methodological issues are postponed to section 4.
The presentation of partial effects in section 5 is a mixture of methodology and results.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Theory of TRQs and Their
Administration
Tariff rate quotas set a quantitative limit on the availability of a tariff reduction. That
is, a comparatively low in-quota tariff tin is levied only up to the quota quantity QQ.
The out-of-quota tariff tout, in contrast, is higher, sometimes much higher than tin,
but its applicability is not limited (Figure 1). The out-of-quota tariff is the regular,
most favored nation tariff bound in the schedules of WTO members. Many of these
tariffs were bound for the first time in the Uruguay Round and were a result of the
so-called tariffication, the conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs. Since quotas and
other non-tariff barriers were far more common in agriculture than in other sectors, this
was considered a significant success of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(URAA).
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Figure 1: TRQ with Varying Demand (Large Country)
However, it became soon apparent that tariffication was often ”dirty”, because tariffs
yielded a higher level of protection than had prevailed before (Ingco 1995). Or, said
in more technical terms, the resulting tariffs were higher than the quota-equivalent
tariff.1 Therefore, so-called current access TRQs were intended to prevent that the
1Even if conversion had always yielded the quota-equivalent tariff, the latter would still not have
reflected the pre-Uruguay-Round level of protection very well. This is due to the reference period
of 1986–88 laid down in the Modalities for tariff conversion, which were years of exceptionally low
world market prices and, accordingly, exceptionally high levels of effective protection in countries
applying quotas (Boughner & de Gorter 1999).
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trade round would actually lead to a decrease in trade. By applying lower tariffs to
previously traded quantities, TRQs could help ensuring that at least the status quo was
maintained. And since obligations to reduce the bound, out-of-quota tariffs were also
part of the Agreement on Agriculture, future trade expansion was in prospect. The
URAA further stipulated that market access equivalent to three percent of domestic
consumption should be provided, if trade had not reached this level before. In order to
comply with this obligation, many countries applied TRQs, so-called minimum access
TRQs.
In sum, TRQs were institutionalized by the URAA with the aim to serve two purposes:
First, current access TRQs were a safeguard of tariffication, which often resulted to be
quite dirty due to the resistance to agricultural trade liberalization in many countries
and the fact that the conversion of non-tariff barriers is, in practice, no exact science.
So TRQs should secure current market access. Second, minimum market access should
be accorded whenever trade had not reached the mark of three percent of domestic
consumption prior to the negotiations. Here, TRQs provided an instrument to implement
the obligation to liberalize while safeguarding, to a good degree, against import surges.
In short, TRQs were meant to support the liberalization of formerly very protected
markets.
Given this origin, it could be expected that the quotas of the TRQs would easily fill.
However, this was often not observed in the years after the round. Instead, a rather
mixed picture evolved with average fill rates that did not meet the above expectations.
Three causes for quota underfill are most probable. First, there can simply be low de-
mand. If demand is not just temporarily, but consistently low, it can be suspected that
the product definition is too narrow or an unattractive market has been deliberately
chosen. Second, the in-quota tariff tin can be too high, rendering imports too expen-
sive. Third, quota administration can impose obstacles to importation or cause higher
transaction costs.
Quota Administration
In the academic literature and the political debate, the term quota administration com-
prises a whole range of quite different measures. There are first of all those administrative
measures that are a constituent part of a TRQ, in the sense that their aim is to solve the
rationing problem inherent in a quantitative restriction. They regulate importers’ access
to the quota. In contrast, country-specific allocations govern quota access on the supply
side. Though an import quota can be effective without them, they are often applied
in practice. Finally, there are often regulations in force that inhibit trade, or change
its distribution, but which do not actually belong to quota administration: they can be
applied irrespective of whether a quota is in force or not. Examples are discriminating
practices against foreign import firms or requirements on how raw products are to be
processed.
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Here, the focus of attention will lie on transaction costs and x-inefficiency caused by
rationing. As Skully (1999, p.4) puts it, on the point: ”Rationing is the essence of
TRQ administration”. The reason is that the quota inhibits the market mechanism to
balance supply and demand for any price higher than p˜, where importers are willing to
purchase a larger quantity than QQ and exporters want to sell a larger quantity than
QQ. Therefore, a rationing system must be established that determines who is to import
under a quota. As already mentioned, TRQ administration often also regulates which
exporting countries may supply under the quota, even though it is sufficient that the
quantitative limit is imposed on just one market side.
Of course, if the quota does not fill, it is not necessary to impose its quantitative limit.
But since this is not –or should not, at least– be known ex ante, the rationing sys-
tem must be in place anyhow. This is also the case if the quota is not effective –
or binding, in technical vocabulary– any more, that is if out-of-quota imports occur.
Then, importers can usually be expected to rather pay the lower in-quota tariff than
the higher out-of-quota tariff, and the rationing system must determine who of them
will be the lucky importers. If, however, the spread between the two tariffs is not very
large, but transaction costs caused by quota administration are, all importers are rather
unlucky.
Transaction costs specific to quota administration are, for instance: costs of getting
informed about the administrative method applied and the requirements to be met in
order to qualify for quota access; costs due to the paperwork and time necessary for the
application process; costs for hedging – as far as possible – against the insecurity of not
getting quota access for the firm’s profit-maximizing quantity; costs of speeding up the
importation if the order of application is relevant or the end of the quota period is near;
costs of finding business partners in a given export country, if importers are not free in
their sourcing decisions; opportunity costs of the securities that often have to be lodged
for the case that import licenses are not used.
Besides such transaction costs borne by private business, costs of the state bureaucracy
borne by the taxpayer are also due to quota administration. However, the first are of
greater interest here, because they have a possible impact on trade flows: if different
methods of quota allocation cause transaction costs of differing magnitudes, then some
methods will be preferable to others – unless this advantage is eliminated by higher
x-inefficiency.
So-called x-inefficiency means that firms produce or supply services at higher than op-
timal costs. This is usually associated with imperfect competition. Besides the fact
that rationing has an impact on competitive conditions, a binding quota drives a wedge
between marginal prices of buyers and sellers. The consequence is that trading firms
can afford to be inefficient and real life rationing systems do not prevent this: alloca-
tion does not occur according to relative cost efficiency, but according to some other
criterion.
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In the following, the most frequently applied methods of quota administration will be
presented briefly.
License on Demand (LD)
Importers request licenses for the quantity they plan to import. If total requests exceed
the available quota quantity,1 a pro-rata reduction is applied. If such a reduction is
anticipated, importers have an incentive to exaggerate their requests. The EU requires
security deposits for the license quantities allocated to each importer, so that these run
a risk of loosing the deposit if their license quantity exceeds their import capacity. Thus,
a certain disincentive to exaggerate requests is in force.
This method of import allocation does not select importers at all, it simply adjusts
requested import quantities to the quota if necessary. Consequently, if the quota is
binding and a price premium can be attained on the domestic market, i.e. if rents arise,
it is possible that these are dissipated in inefficient firms not precluded from the market.
But firms, irrespective of their relative competitiveness, have higher costs due to the high
degree of uncertainty that this method of quota allocation entails.
First-Come, First-Served (FC)
This method is self-explaining. It puts a premium on time, because importers have
incurred already a very high percentage of total expenses at the time of being late. In
such a case, they have the choice between paying the higher out-of-quota tariff, store or
dispose the good or, maybe, deviate it to another market. Either way, it is quite likely
that they will suffer losses. If importers do not want to carry the risk of being too late,
quota underfill can be the consequence. In this setting, the informational capacities of
the import authorities become an important factor.
Importers will adjust by making provisions to increase their chances of timely quota
access, for instance by investing in faster modes of transportation or by storing the
commodity at the border before the quota period starts. Evidently, these are again
costs caused by quota administration. Whether x-inefficiency adds to these costs de-
pends, as Skully (1999) puts it, on the correlation between relative cost efficiency and
place in the queue. Arguments for expecting it to be positive or negative can both be
found.
Another disadvantage of this method of import-side rationing is that it can bias the
distribution of exports. If there are no refinements to the procedure that take into
account the distance from the origin of imports, nearby exporting countries are evidently
favored.
1In the EU practice, licenses are usually allocated quarterly so that the quota quantity is –more or
less– a quarter of the total yearly quantity.
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Historical Importers (HI)
The allocation of quota access follows the distribution of trade of a previous reference
period. For instance, importers’ quota shares are determined by their respective av-
erage market shares of the preceding three years. This will obviously lead to a quite
static distribution of trade. Newcomer shares can introduce some dynamics and are the
only chance for other firms to enter the market where, otherwise, competition has been
eliminated. The problem is to find the right size of the newcomer share: if it is too
small, it will remain ineffective and prospective market entrants are discouraged from
building up capacities. If its too large, historical firms will found subsidiaries that sign
as newcomers. Since there will be regulations to prevent this, resources will be used to
enforce them and to circumvent them anyhow.
Besides these problematic features, this method of quota allocation has a clear advantage,
at least for those importing firms favored by the system, i.e. by those who were already
in the market before imposition of the TRQ or quota: it makes planning quite easy.
Both compared to free trade and to other methods of quota allocation, calculation is
much facilitated.
If high fill rates are a priority to regulators, this method of quota allocation is a good
choice. Even in years where imports are not very profitable, importers will think twice
before reducing their imports, because this reduces their future reference quantities and
therefore quota shares.
Other Methods of Quota Administration
Other methods of quota administration like auctioning, state trading entities or producer
groups are not discussed here. They are seldom applied globally and not at all by the
EU. Interested readers may refer to Skully (1999) or Mo¨nnich (2003). In a report on
TRQ administration compiled by the WTO committee on agriculture (WTO 2000b),
applied tariffs are also categorized as a method of quota administration. But if the
in-quota tariff is simply applied on all imports, there is no effective quota in force and
therefore, the term is not very accurate. However, almost half of all TRQs notified at
the WTO in 1999 were applied tariffs (WTO 2000b, p.5).2
2This can be explained as safeguard measures. Once a TRQ is scheduled in accordance with trade
negotiations, a country has the option to change the method of quota administration later and thus
make the quota effective later. The incentive to do so arises from the general rule that WTO member
countries have to compensate adversely affected trade partners if they apply more protectionist
policies than those they have scheduled. In this case, the policy change is not more protectionist
only from a legalist point of view.
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Country-Specific Allocations
Country-specific allocations are quota shares that the importing country reserves for
specific exporting countries. They are therefore a discretionary distribution of access
to the quota that the import country imposes on the supply-side. Usually, at the time
of imposition of the quota, this distribution is based on historical trade flows and not
changed very frequently afterwards.3 Therefore, the arguments are very similar to those
for (or against) the method of historical importers, even though the allocation of market
access occurs at a more aggregated level. Most likely, political considerations will play
a major role for the decision whether country specific allocations should be imposed or
changed. The need to compensate trade partners for the introduction of the quota or the
wish to pursue developmental goals will often dominate over concerns about economic
efficiency.
Since country-specific allocations limit importers in their sourcing decisions, the bargain-
ing position of exporters is improved. Export certificates even magnify this effect. Then,
importers do not only need an import license for the quantity to be imported, but also
a matching export certificate. This requirement counterbalances the bias that otherwise
disadvantages exporters because they can enter into negotiations only with importers
that hold import licenses.4 From all countries imposing TRQs, only the EU makes ex-
tensive use of export certificates.5 In fact, they are highly correlated with the incidence
of country-specific allocations. So it can be expected that they have a negative impact
on fill rates, because they will cause higher costs to importers and because they capture
the effect of country-specific allocations. These, for the reasons mentioned above, are
also not expected to increase efficient allocation of market access.
3 Results
The discussion so far can be summarized as follows: The fill rate of a TRQ is deter-
mined by its quota size and its tariffs relative to import demand. Furthermore, quota
administration will hardly be neutral on the operation of TRQs. This section focuses
on the results of the model that was developed to test these hypotheses and to find out
more about individual effects. Only the most important characteristics of the model
will be described here, while a more formal methodological discussion will follow in
section 4.
3For instance, the predecessor of a US-TRQ for sugar, a quota, was introduced in 1934. Major
reallocation occurred, on average, every 15 years and were always prompted by an economic or
political shock (Skully 1999, p.22).
4This argument does not apply if import side market access is administered according to first-come,
first-served. But, for the EU, this is the case only twice.
5Besides the EU, the US requires them twice, Canada just once (WTO 2000b).
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The dependent variable is a vector of fill rates as notified by the EU at the WTO. Since
only fill rates up to 100% are reported, the regression is censored. Often, however, the
import statistic reports higher import quantities. The excess quantities are assumed
to be ”parallel” imports and not out-of-quota imports for which the out-of-quota tariff
has been paid. This assumption is based on the observation that out-of-quota tar-
iffs are usually substantially higher than the corresponding in-quota tariffs – despite
the reductions proscribed in the URAA (see Appendix). Therefore, out-of-quota im-
ports are assumed to be negligible so that the out-of-quota tariffs do not enter the
model.
The assumption of negligible out-of-quota imports is in line with the assessment of
the OECD (2002). That is, in the many instances where actual imports exceed the
quota size, the exceeding quantities are believed to occur under preferential regimes
of which the EU has plenty, like the Europe-Agreements or the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreements.
Since such imports can be observed frequently and on a large scale, they enter the model
through the variable qtom. This relates the quota quantity QQ to all imports of the
corresponding tariff lines. Its effect will be discussed further down.
Another variable that warrants an explanation is ν. It is a between-group effect that
captures heterogeneity between the different TRQs. To a large degree, this heterogeneity
is expected to be caused by an important missing variable, the relative quota size. The
absolute quota size is of course known, but it is a meaningless quantity if it is not
compared to the size of the domestic market. Given that most TRQs are defined on
a quite differentiated product level, a large number of market studies would have been
necessary to get even close to this measure.
Besides relative quota size, ν also captures product-specific peculiarities not explained
elsewhere. Therefore, it helps avoiding the inconsistency that is expected if an important
variable is missing. It also helps improving the precision of the estimator that is expected
to be low if there is too much unexplained variability. It was possible to estimate ν thanks
to the two-dimensional panel data structure of the data. In the cross-section dimension,
the different TRQs for different products form the so-called groups. The period 1995–
2000 for which observations were collected provides the time-series dimension. In the
cross section, N ≤ 87, because some TRQs were introduced later than 1995. Accordingly,
T ≤ 6.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the model, together with a short description of the
variables.
The import price has a coefficient with a high level of significance, and the coefficient is
positive. There are two arguments to explain this, based on the panel structure of the
data. In the cross section dimension, it means that TRQs for higher-valued products tend
to be better used. Given the relative high importance of transport costs for agricultural
products, this is plausible. With respect to variation over time, the positive coefficient is
only explicable with imports being demand-driven and the EU being the large country
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Table 1: Main Model Results
variable coef. t description
fr dependent variable; notified imports ac-
cording to WTO notifications over quota
size according to EU regulations
ν 1.135 25.08 group effects, see section 4
mprice .090 10.60 cif import prices according to the trade
statistic
qtom -.040 -6.55 quota size in relation to all imports of the
corresponding CN-codes, according to the
import statistic
fc .178 4.32 dummy for first-come, first-served ;
source: WTO (2000b)
hi .172 8.47 dummy for historical importers; source:
WTO (2000b)
ld license on demand; reference administra-
tion method for fc and hi; source: WTO
(2000b)
xcert .107 4.31 dummy for export certificates; highly cor-
related with country-specific allocations;
source: WTO (2000b)
cons .715 35.19 constant
pseudo R2 .46 pseudo-R2 = 1− min. sum of dev.raw sum of dev.
of the textbooks.6 Figure 1 illustrates this. If, unlike presented there, supply was totally
elastic, the import price would not vary with demand shocks. If supply instead of
demand varied, the coefficient would be negative.
This result could be interpreted to imply that imports under TRQs are used to sat-
isfy varying demand. Since total demand is usually rather stable, these variations in
import demand will primarily stem from varying supply of domestic producers. In
other words, imports under WTO-TRQs are primarily a complement to domestic sup-
ply. Nevertheless, the EU import market is so large that its supply function is positively
sloped.
The next argument is closely related to these arguments. The negative coefficient of
qtom means that the higher total imports into the EU, the higher the fill rates of the
WTO-TRQs tend to be. As mentioned above, many of these TRQs are not the only
possibility of entry to the EU market, but one of several. This motivated the inclusion
of the variable qtom which measures QQ/(total imports). Its evaluation shows that
the incidence of such parallel import regimes is not negligible: For 270 observations,
qtom < 0.8, implying that total imports are at least 25 percent (1/0.8 = 1.25) larger
6The two-step procedure to account for the group effects (section 4) distills the cross-section dimension.
The coefficient of mprice is positive in both regressions, the between-groups and the pooled one.
This indicates that the two separate arguments can both be valid.
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than the quota quantity. The mean of these observations is 0.3. Since it is impossible to
link import quantities to the regime under which they took place, it cannot be excluded
that some of these are ”real” out-of-quota imports, for which the out-of-quota tariff has
been paid. As has been already argued, this is not expected to be the case very often,
given the generally high level of out-of-quota tariffs. In any case, a high value of qtom
signals an attractive market.
Conversely, if qtom < 0.8, the WTO-TRQ is probably the only opportunity to enter the
EU market. Since the mean of these observations is 8.2, which translates to an average
fill rate of 0.12, this market access opportunity is generally of low value to market partic-
ipants. In general, the negative coefficient of qtom can be plausibly interpreted to mean
that an attractive market tends to lead to higher fill rates of the WTO-TRQs, though
these might be small compared to other import opportunities.
Coming to the administrative variables, they all have significant and positive coefficients.
The dummies for historical importers and first-come, first served compare to license on
demand, while the reference situation of export certificates is that none are required.
This essentially means that there are no country-specific allocations, because these two
variables are highly correlated. It was expected that the higher bureaucracy caused
by export certificates would lead to lower fill rates. Likewise, it was expected that
the reduced competition caused by country-specific allocations would lead to lower fill
rates. However, neither of these expectations was supported by the data: the coefficient
estimate of xcert is positive and not negative.
That reduced competition would cause lower fill rates could also be expected for his-
torical importers. Here, too, the results of the model do not confirm this expectation.
In both cases, the guaranteed and calculable quota access reduces insecurity. This ap-
parently dominates any negative effects that either country-specific allocations or the
method of historical importers might have anyhow. That is: the positive coefficients
that both dummies have do not imply that these methods are efficient. These methods
of quota administration do not ensure that the lowest cost firms get quota access or that
production is cost efficient in the first place. The positive coefficients only suggest that
export certificates respective country-specific allocations lead to higher fill rates and that
the method of historical importers leads to higher fill rates than the method of license
on demand.
As far as the method of first-come, first-served is concerned, it was a priori not really
clear whether it implies a lower or higher level of insecurity than license on demand.
But apparently importers have adapted to the system and can better deal with it than
with the randomness of license allocation of the latter. Therefore, the method of license
on demand performs poorly compared to the other methods of quota allocation applied
by the EU. The formal model in de Gorter et al. (2003) provides a possible explana-
tion: this method restrains the most efficient firm first, while less competitive firms
can get closer or even reach their optimal import quantity. Adding imperfect informa-
tion and the insecurity it entails, it is not surprising that fill rates are comparatively
low.
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Taking everything together, administration matters. It matters besides import prices,
parallel imports and the group effect. This latter is supposed to capture mainly the un-
observable effect of relative quota size, but it will also capture any otherwise unexplained
heterogeneity of the products in question.
In contrast to these findings, it is remarkable that the in-quota tariff does not appear
to make a significant contribution to explain fill rates. Furthermore, it was surprising
that the relative price difference between the domestic and the import price of the
product in question did also not yield a coefficient with a satisfying level of significance.
These results will be discussed in more detail further down, in connection with the
development of the model. Therefore, the properties of the model should be described
first.
4 The Model
When devising a model that could be used to test which variables determine the fill
rates of TRQs and whether quota administration belongs to them, three things had to
be taken into account:
1. A variable that is expected to be a very important determinant for both fill rates
and prices, namely the relative quota size, is missing. More precisely, the relative
quota size is de facto unobservable, because data on the size of the domestic market
are usually not available, given the very specific product definitions for most TRQs.
2. The data on fill rates are censored. This is naturally due to the very purpose
of a quota, as can be seen in Figure 1. In the inelastic stretch of the effective
supply curve, differing demand conditions do not prompt changes in import quan-
tities. As has been discussed above, it is assumed that out-of-quota imports are,
in general, not economically viable. Where imports exceed those notified under
WTO-TRQs, the excess quantities are assumed to take place under other, bilateral
import arrangements of the EU.
3. Possible simultaneity must be taken into account. If prices are expected to affect
fill rates, fill rates might as well affect prices. This appears even more probable
given that the discussion from above has shown that quota administration can be
expected, in many instances, to affect both prices and fill rates.
Omitting such an important variable as relative quota size would have risked in-
consistent and unprecise estimators. Therefore, as already mentioned, the idea was to
take advantage of the panel structure of the data and introducing the group variable
ν:
yit = β
′xit + νi + εit, εit | xi, νi ∼ N [0, σ2ε ] (1)
The classical panel techniques of fixed effects and random effects differ in the method of
estimating the νi and in the assumptions concerning the correlation between the group
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effect and the regressors (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 251–52). In a random effects model,
ν is assumed to be independent of the regressors and it is assumed to be normally
distributed, as νi | xi,∼ N [0, σ2ν ]. The fixed effect model treats the νi as group-specific
constants.
Panel regression had to be combined be with censored regression, because regular
regression techniques that do not account for data censoring yield, again, inconsistent
estimators. The standard approach is the tobit model which is estimated with maximum
likelihood. The unobserved effects tobit model following Wooldridge (2002, pp.540–42)
combines a tobit with a random effects model. Its loglikelihood function is maximized
with respect to β, σν and σε, maximizing the joint probability of all groups. This model
is already implemented in Stata7, which approximates the function and calculates the
derivatives with a M-point Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Stata Press 2001a, p.28). For
this method to work, however, ρ = σ2ν/(σ
2
ε + σ
2
ν) must not be too large. Otherwise,
the function is not well-approximated by a polynomial (Stata Press 2001b, pp.477–
478). Here, the estimated ρ ≈ .73 is to be blamed for the numerical instability that
was confirmed by a sensitivity test for numerical soundness provided by Stata (Stata
Press 2001a, pp.28–32).
Honore´ (1992) proposes a fixed effects model for censored regression settings. However,
fixed effects rely, for estimation, on the so-called within-group variation, that is, on
variation within a cross-section unit over time. Since the method of quota administra-
tion, once fixed, is usually not changed for given TRQs,7 this approach was also not
practicable.
Following approach to solve the omitted variable problem turned out to be practicable:
The model was estimated twice. In the first step, a pure cross section regression was
performed with the averages per TRQ over time. That is, all variation over time was
eliminated, so that estimation was based solely on between-group variation. The resid-
uals from this regression were used, in the second step, as proxy for the group effects νi.
Though they do not only capture the effect of the omitted variable ”relative quota size”,
but any product peculiarities as well, they served their intended purpose quite well. This
was first, to avoid the inconsistency of a regression with an important regressor missing
and second, to get a better estimate for σ2, because an inflated σˆ2 (that incorporates ν)
makes confidence intervals shrink. As can be seen in Table 2, the second effect turned
out to be more important. It compares the estimates of the first, in-between regression
with the pooled regression including the proxies for ν.
Since both regressions use pure cross-section techniques of estimation, the censored
regression model does not need to be, simultaneously, a panel data model any more. But
instead of using the regular cross-section tobit approach, a median regression adapted to
7In fact, the banana TRQ is the only exception. Here, some changes were prompted by different WTO
rulings (see Herrmann, Kramb & Mo¨nnich (2003)). However, these changes occurred within a given
method of administration, so that the dummies do not change.
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Table 2: The Effect of the ν-Correction
Comparison of Coefficients Comparison of Standard Errors
in-between pooled in-between pooled
(n=79) (n=428) (n=79) (n=428)
β1 .071 .090 seβ1 .04 .008
β2 -.051 -.040 seβ2 .012 .006
β3 .178 .172 seβ3 .085 .020
β4 .114 .178 seβ4 .13 .041
β5 .082 .107 seβ5 .090 .025
data censoring following Powell (1984) was applied: unlike the tobit, it does not hinge
on distributional assumptions and is robust to heteroscedasticity.
As usual, the model formulation is based on an uncensored latent variable y∗. Censoring
occurs from above, at fill rates of 100 percent.
y∗it = β
′xit + εit,
yit = y
∗
it if y
∗
it < 1,
yit = 1 if y
∗
it ≥ 1,
The central idea is based on the aim of median regression, which is to estimate the ex-
pected median, conditional on the regressors: Assuming that the error terms have zero
median, the probability that yi = 1, which is equivalent to the probability that
y∗it = β
′xit + εit ≥ 1,
is less than one-half if β′xit < 1. Likewise, if β′xit > 1, the probability that
y∗it = β
′xit + εi ≥ 1
exceeds one-half. Then, the probability that y∗it = 1 is equally greater than .5 and one
will be the median of yit.
Since the conditional median is the line through the data which minimizes the sum of ab-
solute residuals, the objective function to be minimized with respect to β′ is
1/N
N∑
i=1
|yit −min(β′xit, 1)|. (2)
If β′xit > 1, the value of the term |yit − 1| is unrelated to β′. Thus, minimization is
performed only for observations for which β′xit < 1. The regularity conditions that
must be met for this procedure to work and for this censored least absolute deviations
(CLAD) estimator to be asymptotically normal are quite general and not very restric-
tive (for more details, see Powell (1984) or Mo¨nnich (2003)). In contrast to Powell’s
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Table 3: Results of the Hausman test
var βn βx βn − βx sqrt(diag(Vn − Vx))
β1(hat) .088 .090 -.002 .006
β2 -.04 -.040 -.0002 ·
β3 .177 .172 .005 009
β4 .189 .178 .011 .022
β5 .102 .107 -.004 .013
χ25 0.87 P > χ
2 0.97
Note: The subscripts n and x stand for endogenous and exogenous, respectively.
suggestions, the variance-covariance matrix is bootstrapped. For more detail on how
this and the above minimization task has been implemented using Stata7, see Mo¨nnich
(2003).
The issue of simultaneity turned out not to be a problem. A two-stage procedure in
analogy to 2SLS was applied in order to eliminate possible correlation between the error
terms and the regressors. For this purpose, the price variable was regressed on all exoge-
nous variables. The fitted values were used to replace, in the second stage, the original
observations of the price variable. The coefficient estimates of this second stage were very
similar to the original ones and a Hausman test rejected the H0-hypothesis that the vec-
tor of differences is significantly different from zero (see Table 3).
However, this should not be interpreted to imply that the price variable is in fact endoge-
nous. The Hausman test simply indicates that there is no strong correlation between
the error terms and this is what matters for consistent estimation. In contrast, the
economic interpretation of various model results convincingly argues for simultaneity.
In particular, most arguments why TRQ administration should matter apply equally to
prices as to quantities. This strongly suggests that prices and quantities are determined
simultaneously. In fact, two first stage regressions yielded good results: with the import
price as regressand and with the price difference between the domestic and the import
price (pdiff) as regressand.8
It was a particular surprise that the first-stage regression with pdiff as regressand yielded
good results, while pdiff was not significant as a regressor for the fill rates, whether
assumed to be exogenous or endogenous. Equally surprising was that the in-quota tariff
appears to have a significant –and positive– coefficient only when pdiff was regressed
on it. How does this all fit together? That neither the in-quota tariff nor pdiff have
explanatory power for the TRQ fill rates could be interpreted to indicate that there is
”water in the price transmission”, meaning that domestic prices vary due to factors that
have nothing to do with the import market. This, in turn, is consistent with the model
results of the OECD (2002). According to those, an expansion of all quota quantities by
50% would not lead, in general, to a substantial decrease of domestic prices. Domestic
8It was not attempted to model prices in a two-stage procedure for reasons of identifiability.
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policies are to be blamed for this: they are still in place for many products governed by
TRQs, shielding domestic prices from world prices.
Consequently, it is plausible that the price difference between domestic and import prices
does not –measurably– contribute to explain fill rates. These findings fit in well with the
positive coefficient of the import price. This has been interpreted to imply that imports
are mostly used to complement varying domestic supply.
So far, the focus of attention was on the question which of the possible impacts on fill
rates were or were not statistically significant, how this could be explained and how
this could be modelled in the first place. The magnitude of the effects was excluded
from the discussion. In the next section, a tentative approach to obtain partial effects
is presented.
5 Calculation of Partial Effects
In censored regression settings, the values of the coefficient estimates are not equal to the
marginal partial effects. An adjustment is necessary that accounts for the change in prob-
ability that the observation no longer lies in the uncensored region. It follows that distri-
butional assumptions are needed if this adjustment is to be made.
However, the CLAD regression achieves coefficient estimates without making distribu-
tional assumptions, and this was, besides its robustness, what made it attractive. But
since it was unsatisfactory not to not to be able to get a better feel of the magnitudes of
the effects, the model was re-estimated with tobit, making use of the already estimated
group effects to account for the missing variable problem. This way, the difficulties of
the random effects tobit mentioned above were avoided. This combination of methods
seems not only justified by the interest on the approximate magnitude of the effects, but
also by its results, as documented in Table 4. They indicate, contrary to ex-ante doubts
in this respect, that the real distribution of the fill rates cannot be that far away from
the normal distribution. Therefore, partial effects were tentatively calculated under the
assumption of normality, with the formula:
∂E[y | x]
∂xj
= Φ
(
1− β′x
σ
)
· βj.
For evaluation, the means were used in x. In β′, the mostly lower CLAD estimates were
used, based on the premise that it is preferable to underestimate an effect rather than
to overestimate it. Thus, the adjustment factor is:
Φ
(
1− .804
.256
)
= .778.
Only for the dummy variables for historical importers and first-come, first served are
the differences of the coefficient estimates appreciable. Most likely, the binary format
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Table 4: Comparing the Coefficients of the CLAD and Tobit estimation
CLAD tobit
var coef. t coef. t
nu 1.135 25.08 1.269 21.53
mprice .090 10.60 .092 9.22
qtom -.040 -6.55 -.043 -12.27
hi .172 8.47 .358 5.93
fc .178 4.32 .261 6.55
xcert .107 4.31 .092 2.89
cons .715 35.19 .763 27.82
Pseudo-R2 .55 Pseudo-R2 .83
σ .256
The value of the χ26 − statistic of the LR-test for the tobit model is 404.08 with Prob > χ2 =
0.00.
of the variables is responsible for these differences. For binary variables, relative effects
were calculated according to the formula
graw =
E[y | xj = 1]− E[y | xj = 0]
E[y | xj = 0] .
and then adjusted for data censoring. The results of all these calculations can be
seen in table 5. At the mean of the data, prices matter, and administration mat-
ters.
Table 5: Estimated Partial Effects
var mean coef. ∂E[y|x]
∂xj
δ g
nu -.09 1.135
mprice 1.88 .09 .07 .16
qtom 1.51 -.04 -.03 -.06
hi .08 .172 .17
fc .22 .178 .18
xcert .27 .107 .11
cons .715
6 Conclusions
It was the aim of this work to develop an econometric model that explains the fill
rates of the EU’s TRQs fairly well, at least well enough to be able to test whether
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quota administration plays a role as well. The discussion of the rationing problem that
is immanent in any quantitative restriction led to the quite general expectation that
somehow, it would. However, a closer theoretical analysis of the different methods of
quota allocation did often not allow a conclusive argument whether the effect is expected
to be positive or negative. The results generally confirm that quota administration
is indeed not neutral, but sometimes they do not confirm common presumptions. In
particular, allocating quota shares according to historical trade flows, be it on the import
side for firms or on the export side for countries, does not appear to cause quota underfill.
The inefficiencies attributed to this way of rationing cannot be as serious as expected,
at least as far as the WTO-TRQs of the EU are concerned.
However, it should not be concluded that TRQs would generally perform better if their
quota administration was changed to the methods that seem to perform relatively bet-
ter. First, such changes will probably be disruptive, because market participants have
adapted to the method of administration in place. The example of the banana TRQ
strongly suggests so (Herrmann et al. 2003). More importantly, the familiar critique
against TRQs is still of great importance. That is, out-of-quota tariffs are often pro-
hibitive with the consequence that TRQs are really quotas; quota rents are dysfunctional
to competitive markets; the rationing problem can never be solved satisfactorily and the
bureaucracy needed to administer quotas and to be administered is costly. For these
reasons, the proclaimed purpose of TRQs to ease the transition from a quota to a tar-
iff system should be taken seriously. Continuing to reduce out-of-quota tariffs would
surely be very appropriate. Increasing quota size as well, especially of those TRQs that
are consistently filled to 100 percent, improves market access immediately and has the
potential of reducing the distortive effects of quota administration.
But whenever new TRQs are introduced with the justification of creating new market
access, whether minimum or not, then these results should be taken into consideration.
At the same time, analysis of the variable qtom has indicated that some TRQs are of
little commercial interest. Restrictive product definitions often seem to be responsible
for this. Therefore, provisions to prevent such definitional restrictions still need to be
improved as well.
In sum, quota administration matters. So do the ”classical” parameters of TRQs.
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Appendix
Figure 2 illustrates that the tariff reductions negotiated at the Uruguay Round have
shown results, while Figure 3 shows that individual out-of-quota tariffs are very of-
ten still multiples of the respective in-quota tariff.9 Simple frequencies –i.e., each
observation enters with equal weight– were compared with the distribution resulting
from weighting each observation with its relative import value share. This compari-
son shows that the ratio tout/tin tends to be higher for TRQs of greater commercial
importance.
9Zero in-quota tariffs were replaced with a fictitious rate of one percent, in order to avoid losing 16
observations. Eleven observations are missing. These are mostly TRQs for fruits, for which no
regular out-of-quota tariffs exist.
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Figure 2: In-quota and Out-of-quota tariffs, 1995–2000
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Sources: Own calculations based on various EC-Regulations, Eurostat.
Note: For TRQs with various tariff lines, import quantities were used for aggregation. Specific
tariffs were converted to ad-valorem equivalents with average import prices. For the value-
weighted average, each TRQ was weighted with its share of total import value (of all WTO-
TRQs).
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Figure 3: Ratios of tout/tin, frequencies and value-weighted distribution for 2000
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Sources: Own calculations based on EC-Regulation (European Commission 1999), Eurostat.
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